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Mental capacity, diagnosis and insight in
psychiatric in-patients: a cross-sectional study
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Background. Mental capacity is now a core part of UK mental health law and clinicians will increasingly be expected
to assess it. Because it is a legal concept there is a need to clarify associations with variables that clinicians are more
familiar with, especially insight.
Method. In this cross-sectional study we recruited consecutive psychiatric admissions to the Maudsley Hospital,
London. We carried out structured assessments of decision making using the MacArthur Competence Assessment
Tool for Treatment (MacCAT-T), resulting in a clinical judgement about capacity status. We analysed associations
with a range of sociodemographic and clinical variables, including insight score on the Expanded Schedule for the
Assessment of Insight (SAI-E). The same variables were compared in an analysis stratiﬁed according to diagnostic
group : psychotic disorders/bipolar aﬀective disorder (BPAD)/non-psychotic disorders.
Results. Psychotic disorders and manic episodes of BPAD are most strongly associated with incapacity. In such
patients, insight is the best discriminator of capacity status. In patients with non-psychotic disorders, insight is less
strongly associated with capacity ; in this group depressed mood discriminates capacity status whereas it does not in
psychotic disorders. Cognitive performance does not discriminate capacity status in patients with psychotic
disorders.
Conclusions. Mental capacity has complex relationships with psychopathological variables, and these relationships
are diﬀerent according to diagnostic group. Insight is the best discriminator of capacity status in psychotic disorders
and BPAD but not in non-psychotic disorders.
Received 11 March 2008 ; Revised 5 August 2008 ; Accepted 5 September 2008 ; First published online 22 October 2008
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Background
Decision-making capacity is increasingly central
to medical law and ethics, reﬂected by new legis-
lation both in Scotland (the Adults with Incapacity
(Scotland) Act 2000) and in England and Wales (the
Mental Capacity Act 2005). The American Psychiatric
Association (APA) recommended mental capacity as
a test for civil commitment in 1983 (Stromberg &
Stone, 1983) and some states have adopted this test.
Scotland’s Mental Health (Care and Treatment) Act
2003 uses the criterion of ‘ impaired decision making’
(a notion diﬃcult to separate from decision-making
incapacity). The code of practice for the amended
Mental Health Act 1983 for England and Wales,
although not capacity based, outlines a procedure for
assessing decision-making capacity on patients under-
going a Mental Health Act assessment (Department of
Health, 2008). Although controversy continues over
whether decision-making capacity can become a basis
for a uniﬁed mental health law (Dawson & Szmukler,
2006), mental capacity will have increasingly practical
ramiﬁcations for psychiatrists in the UK.
The concept of decision-making capacity has
emerged from law rather than from psychiatry or
medicine more generally. It serves in law to protect
individual autonomy and stands as a precondition for
a valid consent or refusal. Because of the legal origins
of the capacity concept, questions may be asked about
how clinicians can make sense of it. This is particularly
important for psychiatrists, who, although not holding
any monopoly over capacity assessment, have a
professional status as experts on mental disorder that
will inevitably extend to assessment of mental ca-
pacity. In this study we aimed to examine the clinical
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associations of capacity so that points of contact can be
made between the legal concept and clinical variables
that clinicians use and are familiar with. We aimed to
do this in a setting where the decision-making issues
are crucial to practice – a point soon after admission to
a psychiatric hospital from the community.
Despite its uneven quality, it is possible to draw
some conclusions from previous research on the
associations of incapacity (Okai et al. 2007). Socio-
demographic variables are not generally associated
with capacity whereas clinical variables are. Which
clinical variables are associated depends upon clinical
setting and diagnostic group. In general hospital
patients and elderly groups in most clinical settings,
neuropsychological variables, especially cognitive
impairments, are strongly associated with clinical
judgements of incapacity (Etchells et al. 1997; Raymont
et al. 2004). In psychiatric patients, psychopathological
variables, especially insight and delusions, are
strongly associated (Bellhouse et al. 2003a, b ; Cairns
et al. 2005). Studies in patients with schizophrenia that
have not involved a judgement of capacity status re-
port correlations between poor cognitive performance
and scorings of legal standards, especially ‘under-
standing’ (Carpenter et al. 2000 ; Palmer et al. 2004,
2005 ; Wong et al. 2005; Palmer & Jeste, 2006).
Insight is the clinical concept that is most closely
associated with the legal concept of capacity (Cairns
et al. 2005). Lack of insight is a complex and multi-
dimensional phenomenon that is a core feature of
schizophrenia (McEvoy et al. 1989) but is also common
in mania and in forms of organic brain injury
(Amador, 2004). Lack of insight is a term that is easier
to use than to deﬁne (Fulford, 2004), but the basic
concept, that of an unawareness of illness, has ac-
quired an acknowledged place in the mental state
examination and has proven capable of measurement
for research purposes (David, 1990). The signiﬁcance
of loss of insight for decision-making capacity is ap-
parent on considering the group of patients who are in
the following predicament :
(1) they are mentally ill ;
(2) they are unaware of this illness (they lack insight) ;
(3) there is a causal connection between their mental
illness and their unawareness of this illness.
Kress (2004) has argued that advances in our under-
standing of insight and our ability to measure it pro-
vide good reason for giving loss of insight a more
signiﬁcant role in legal evaluations of competent de-
cision making. Diesfeld (2003), however, argued that
the insight concept remains legally ill-deﬁned and its
frequent use as an extra-legislative criterion in de-
termining psychiatric detention threatens the purpose
of legally safeguarding the liberty interests of patients.
Certainly, if the insight concept is to have legal inﬂu-
ence, its relationship to legal concepts, especially
mental capacity, should be made transparent.
In this study we aimed to perform a detailed de-
scriptive analysis of the clinical associations of deci-
sional incapacity as a structured judgement in the
psychiatric setting. In particular, we sought to test
whether the associations between decisional capacity
and psychopathological variables, particularly insight,
are modiﬁed by diagnostic group.
Method
Participants
We performed a cross-sectional study based in three
general adult acute psychiatric wards (one female and
two male) at the Maudsley Hospital, London, UK.
These wards served part of Southwark, a deprived
inner-London borough with an ethnically diverse
population. The local research ethics committee ap-
proved the study. Further details of the study are
given in Owen et al. (2008).
Consecutive patients, admitted between February
2006 and June 2007, were identiﬁed by regular exam-
ination of the electronic medical records and con-
sultations with the ward nursing staﬀ. All admissions
were included other than those admitted during
planned research breaks. The sole exclusions were
patients from other catchment areas admitted to the
wards and patients transferred from other in-patient
facilities. All patients who spoke English were ap-
proached for a research interview. Those who
assented were provided with full details of the study
and the interview was stopped if there was any sub-
sequent change in choice or resistance. Written con-
sent was sought and patients were oﬀered £5 for
their time. Interviews were conducted as close to the
admission as possible.
Assessment of capacity
Relevant information about the patient’s presenting
problems, diagnosis and treatment plan was obtained
from the medical record and discussion with the
clinical team. The clinical researcher (G.S.O.) deter-
mined whether the treating team’s principal treatment
concerned medication or admission to hospital. If it
was medication, then the capacity assessment centred
on the decision to take the prescribed medication or
not. This involved a disclosure about that medication
and its risks and beneﬁts. If it was hospitalization then
it was the capacity to decide on whether to come into
hospital or not. This involved disclosures about what
the hospital oﬀered (e.g. focused assessment, place of
safety), what out-patient services oﬀered (e.g. home
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environment, follow-up) and their risks and beneﬁts.
This scheme was adopted to reﬂect the decisions that
face most patients in the acute setting and to keep the
interviews reasonably focused and unburdened.
The presence or absence of capacity to decide on
treatment was based on the two-stage test formulated
in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. This requires
(1) evidence of ‘an impairment of, or disturbance in,
the functioning of the mind or brain’ [Section 2(1)] ;
and (2) evidence that this impairment or disturbance
means that the person is unable to make a speciﬁc
decision [Section 3(1)]. We interpreted the ﬁrst stage of
the test using clinical psychopathological concepts and
ICD-10 diagnoses (WHO, 1992).
The capacity judgement was facilitated by a clinical
assessment (notes review and clinical interview) and
the administration of the MacArthur Competence
Assessment Tool for Treatment (MacCAT-T; Grisso
et al. 1997 ; Applebaum, 2007). The MacCAT-T is a
semi-structured interview that provides relevant in-
formation disclosures to patients about their illness,
the nature of treatment options and their risks and
beneﬁts. The assessor evaluates capacity in terms of
four abilities relating to the disclosures : understand-
ing, appreciation, reasoning and expressing a choice.
These abilities map onto the abilities regarded as rel-
evant by the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which are
understanding, retaining, using, weighing and com-
municating. ‘Using’ is the term the Law Commission
favoured in place of the term ‘appreciation ’ (Law
Commission, 1995, para. 3.17). We interpreted the
terms to have equivalent meanings.
The content of the MacCAT-T was modiﬁed for this
study. When the principal treatment decision con-
cerned medication, patients were given a disclosure
about ‘no medication’ as the alternative to the ‘re-
commended’ medication rather than going through all
medication options. This was done to simplify the in-
terview and to reﬂect the main choice that patients
who are acutely ill typically face. When the principal
treatment decision concerned hospitalization, patients
were given a disclosure about the option of being an
in-patient or not. Each disclosure involved giving the
patient simple information about the nature of the
option and its risks and beneﬁts. The form of the
MacCAT-T was left unaltered by these changes.
Previous studies have demonstrated excellent inter-
rater reliability (k>0.8) when the MacCAT-T is used
in this way (Cairns et al. 2005 ; Okai et al. 2007).
Other variables
The Expanded Schedule for the Assessment of In-
sight (SAI-E ; Sanz et al. 1998) and the Brief Psychi-
atric Rating Scale (BPRS; Ventura et al. 1993) were
also administered. Both are clinically based, semi-
structured interviews. The SAI-E comprises three
main dimensions (awareness of illness, relabelling of
symptoms as abnormal, and treatment compliance).
A total score and subscores based on the three di-
mensions were calculated. We adjusted the total BPRS
score to account for domains of psychopathology that
were not assessable (e.g. hallucinations in a mute pa-
tient) by summing subscores and dividing the total by
the number of BPRS domains that were assessable.
This was to obtain a measure of total psychopathology
that was not misleadingly low in patients who did not
respond to questions about symptoms.
We used the matrix reasoning subtest from the
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI ;
PsychCorp, 1999) to assess cognition. This consists of
four non-verbal reasoning tasks : pattern recognition,
classiﬁcation, analogy, and serial reasoning. The
examinee looks at a matrix from which a section is
missing and completes the matrix either by saying
the number of or by pointing to one of ﬁve response
options. This subtest has the advantage of being less
dependent on language in a sample where many did
not have English as a ﬁrst language. We converted raw
scores into age-adjusted t-score equivalents according
to the manual.
Sociodemographic and clinical variables were col-
lected from the medical records and nursing obser-
vations. Broad ICD-10 categories were used for main
diagnoses. Alcohol and substance use and depen-
dency were recorded as separate variables for each
admission. For all admissions estimations of global
functioning (APA, 2000) and a summary of com-
pliance with treatment ranging from complete rejec-
tion (1) to active participation (7) (item C of the SAI-E)
were obtained.
Statistical analysis
Analyses were performed using Stata release 9.2 (Stata
Corporation, College Station, TX, USA) and software
for calculation of eﬀect size (Wuensch, 2007). Con-
ventional bivariate methods were used to compare
patient groups. We analysed capacity as a binary
status in the whole sample and three broad diagnostic
subgroups: psychotic disorders (comprising schizo-
phrenia, schizo-aﬀective disorder and psychotic
episode), bipolar aﬀective disorder (BPAD; compris-
ing both manic and depressive episodes) and non-
psychotic disorders [comprising unipolar depression,
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and personality
disorder]. We stratiﬁed the sample in this way because
the broad diagnostic groups are familiar to clinicians,
have nosological signiﬁcance (albeit not pure or
uncontested) and aﬀord suﬃcient power for analysis.
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We also expected to ﬁnd that these broad diagnostic
groups would modify the associations of psycho-
pathological variables with incapacity. Logistic re-
gression was performed to address confounding and
to detect eﬀect modiﬁcation between independent
variables and diagnostic group on mental capacity.
Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve analysis
was performed to assess the ability of continuous
measures of insight to discriminate between patients
with and without capacity in the three diagnostic
groups. We have used odds ratios (ORs) and Hedges’
g as the eﬀect size statistics. Hedges’ g is Cohen’s d
adjusted for sample size.
Results
Our previous paper (Owen et al. 2008) shows the ﬂow
of patients into the study and provides information
about non-participants. A total of 350 patients were
admitted from the community. Two hundred (57.1%)
were seen by the clinical researcher and were assessed
using the MacCAT-T and the other semi-structured
interviews. Of the 150 patients not seen by the
researcher, 84 refused a research interview, 29 were
discharged before being seen, 23 were non-English
speakers (seven White, seven Black or Asian, nine
Other), nine were not available for interview, three
were too violent to approach and two were too dis-
tressed to approach. Table 1 compares basic demo-
graphic, clinical and legal variables for patients who
did not participate in the interviews versus those who
did. Non-participants were more likely to refuse
treatment and have fewer years of contact with ser-
vices. There were no other signiﬁcant diﬀerences.
Table 2 compares sociodemographic, clinical and
interview variables for all participants. It also com-
pares psychopathological variables that previous re-
search has highlighted as relevant to capacity (Okai
et al. 2007).
Sociodemographic and basic clinical variables
Table 2 shows an association of diagnosis and mental
incapacity. BPAD (manic episode) shows the strongest
association with incapacity. Depression and person-
ality disorder show an association with capacity.
The drug and alcohol variables (excluding cannabis)
were associated with retaining capacity, as was the
principal treatment being hospitalization rather than
stabilization on medication.
Table 1. Comparison of non-participants and participants : demographic and clinical variables
Variable Non-participants Participants Test statistic p value
Total group, n 150 200
Age (years), mean (S.D.) 36.7 (11.4) 39.1 (11.3) t=x1.93, df=348 0.05
Diagnosis, n (%)
Organic brain syndrome 1 (0.7) 4 (2.0) x2=9.08, df=9 0.43
Schizophrenia 45 (30.0) 39 (19.5)
Schizo-aﬀective disorder 10 (6.7) 10 (5.0)
Psychotic episode 33 (22.0) 44 (22.0)
BPAD – manic episode 13 (8.7) 23 (11.5)
BPAD – depression episode 2 (1.3) 6 (3.0)
Depression 25 (16.7) 46 (23.0)
PTSD 2 (1.3) 3 (1.5)
Personality disorder 10 (6.7) 15 (7.5)
Other 9 (6.0) 10 (5.0)
Years of contact, median (IQR) 5 (2–14) 10 (3–20) Mann–Whitney
z=x2.30
0.02
o2 admissions, n (%) 78 (52.0) 101 (50.5) x2=0.08, df=1 0.78
GAF score, n (%)
Non-serious dysfunction (100–51) 3 (2.0) 6 (3.0) x2=0.43, df=2 0.81
Serious dysfunction (50–21) 63 (42.0) 80 (40.0)
Serious dysfunction and/or danger (20–1) 84 (56.0) 114 (57.0)
Treatment refusal, SAI-E (C), mean (S.D.) 3.6 (2.0) 4.4 (2.0) t=x4.10, df=348 <0.001
Detained under law, n (%) 73 (48.7) 80 (40.0) x2=2.62, df=1 0.11
BPAD, Bipolar-aﬀective disorder ; PTSD, post-traumatic stress disorder ; IQR, interquartile range ; GAF, Global Assessment
of Functioning ; SAI-E (C), Expanded Schedule for the Assessment of Insight, item C; S.D., standard deviation ; df, degrees of
freedom.
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Table 2. Associations of incapacity in all patients admitted to psychiatric hospital
Variable Incapacity Capacity
Eﬀect size estimate
Hedges’ g (95% CI)a OR (95% CI)
Sample size, n 115 85
Age (years), mean (S.D.) 40.1 (11.2) 37.9 (11.4) 0.19 (x0.10 to 0.47)
Gender, n (%)
Male 65 (56.5) 61 (71.8) 1
Female 50 (43.5) 24 (28.2) 0.19 (1.07–3.56)
Ethnicity, n (%)
White European 45 (39.1) 61 (71.8) 1
Black African 34 (29.6) 6 (7.1) 0.14 (0.05–0.37)
Black Caribbean 20 (17.4) 9 (10.6) 0.32 (0.13–0.78)
Black – Other 5 (4.4) 6 (7.1) 0.76 (0.13–2.67)
Other ethnic minority 11 (9.6) 3 (3.5) 0.17 (0.05–0.66)
Years of education since age 10, mean (S.D.) 6.9 (3.0) 7.0 (2.9) x0.04 (0.00 to 0.28)
Main diagnosis, n (%)
Psychotic episode 29 (25.2) 15 (17.7) 1
Schizophrenia 31 (27.0) 8 (9.4) 0.50 (0.18–1.35)
Schizo-aﬀective disorder 9 (7.8) 1 (1.2) 0.21 (0.02–1.86)
BPAD – manic episode 22 (19.1) 1 (1.2) 0.09 (0.01–0.72)
BPAD – depression episode 1 (0.9) 5 (5.9) 9.67 (1.03–90.4)
Depression 15 (13.0) 31 (36.5) 4.0 (1.66–9.60)
Personality disorder 1 (0.9) 14 (16.5) 27.1 (3.24–226.0)
Other 3 (2.6) 7 (8.2) 4.5 (1.02–20.00)
PTSD 0 (0) 3 (3.5) –
Organic brain syndrome 4 (3.5) 0 (0) –
Years of contact with psychiatric
services, mean (S.D.)
12.3 (10.9) 12.3 (11.0) 0.00 (x0.06 to 0.06)
Number of previous psychiatric admissions, n (%)
0 27 (23.5) 29 (34.1) 1
1 23 (20.0) 20 (23.5) 0.81 (0.37–0.79)
2 10 (8.7) 6 (7.1) 0.56 (0.18–1.75)
3–5 18 (15.7) 17 (20.0) 0.88 (0.38–2.05)
>5 37 (32.2) 13 (15.3) 0.33 (0.14–0.74)
Alcohol or drug dependent, n (%) 7 (23.3) 23 (76.7) 0.17 (0.7–0.43)
Prominent recent history of cannabis use, n (%) 26 (59.1) 18 (40.9) 1.08 (0.55–2.15)
Prominent recent history of alcohol use, n (%) 24 (40.0) 36 (60.0) 0.36 (0.19–0.67)
Prominent recent history of
other substance use, n (%)
10 (35.7) 18 (64.3) 0.35 (0.15–0.81)
Principal treatment, n (%)
Hospitalization 40 (34.8) 66 (77.7) 1
Medication 75 (65.2) 19 (22.4) 0.15 (0.08–0.29)
Time between admission and
interview (days), mean (S.D.)
2.4 (1.5) 2.1 (1.5) 0.17 (x0.11 to 0.45)
Insight, mean (S.D.) 9.8 (7.2) 23.2 (4.4) x2.19 (x1.83 tox2.55)
Total BPRS (adjusted), mean (S.D.) 2.3 (0.67) 1.8 (0.3) 1.04 (0.74 to 1.34)
Unusual thought content, mean (S.D.) 4.5 (2.2) 1.7 (1.1) 1.55 (1.22 to 1.88)
Conceptual disorganization, mean (S.D.) 2.5 (1.7) 1.1 (0.3) 1.12 (0.81 to 1.42)
Hallucinations, mean (S.D.) 3.2 (2.4) 2.2 (1.8) 0.43 (0.13 to 0.74)
Elevated mood, mean (S.D.) 2.4 (2.1) 1.1 (0.6) 0.76 (0.46 to 1.05)
Depression, mean (S.D.) 2.5 (2.1) 3.5 (1.7) x0.55 (x0.27 tox0.85)
Matrix reasoning, mean (S.D.) 35.0 (11.5) 41.5 (13.3) x0.52 (x0.21 tox0.84)
BPAD, Bipolar-aﬀective disorder ; PTSD, post-traumatic stress disorder ; BPRS, Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale ; OR, odds ratio ;
CI, conﬁdence interval ; S.D., standard deviation.
a The 95% CIs are about Cohen’s d.
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There was an apparent association between being
both female and non-White and lacking capacity. We
tested whether these associations could be explained
by known confounders. The excess of women lacking
mental capacity can be explained by the higher num-
ber of men being admitted with alcohol or substance
dependence. Typically, these categories are associated
with preserved capacity, and once controlled for, the
association between female sex and lack of capacity
disappears [OR unadjusted 1.96, 95% conﬁdence in-
terval (CI) 1.07–3.56 ; OR adjusted 1.47, 95% CI 0.78–
2.75]. The diﬀerence with ethnic group was accounted
for by diﬀerent patterns of substance misuse, self-
harm and diagnostic group. More black and ethnic
minority groups had diagnoses of psychotic episode,
schizophrenia or mania, and fewer had histories of
substance misuse or self-harm; controlling for these
variables changed the eﬀect sizes markedly [OR for
Black Caribbean versus White 0.32 (95% CI 0.13–0.78)
unadjusted; 0.98 (95% CI 0.34–2.86) adjusted; OR for
Black African versus White 0.14 (95% CI 0.05–0.37)
unadjusted; 0.37 (95% CI 0.12–1.13) adjusted].
Psychopathological variables (excluding insight)
Table 2 shows the associations between psychopatho-
logical variables and incapacity in all participants. We
deal with insight separately below. We have used
Hedges’ g as our eﬀect size statistic. The eﬀect size is
large for unusual thought content (delusion) (g=1.55),
conceptual disorganization (thought disorder) (g=
1.12) and total BPRS score adjusted as described above
(g=1.04). Hallucinations and poor matrix reasoning
were associated with incapacity but the eﬀect sizes
were smaller (g=0.43 and x0.52 respectively). De-
pressed mood was associated with retaining capacity
with moderate eﬀect size (g=x0.55).
Table 3 shows the eﬀect sizes of psychopathological
variables as discriminators of capacity stratiﬁed by
three diagnostic groups : psychotic disorders (schizo-
phrenia, schizo-aﬀective disorder and psychotic episode),
BPAD (manic and depressive episodes) and non-
psychotic disorders (unipolar depression, PTSD and
personality disorder).
High total BPRS score and unusual thought content
were both associated with lack of capacity in all
diagnostic groups. Conceptual disorganization was
associated with incapacity in psychotic disorders and
BPAD but not in non-psychotic disorders. Halluci-
nations were associated with incapacity in non-
psychotic disorders but not in psychotic disorders or
BPAD. Elated mood was strongly associated with
incapacity in BPAD but not in other categories. De-
pressed mood and matrix reasoning were associatedT
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with lack of capacity in non-psychotic disorders but not
in psychotic disorders or BPAD.
Because of previous interest in the relationship be-
tween incapacity and cognition in patients with psy-
chotic disorders, we tested how matrix reasoning
correlated with the MacCAT-T subscores in this
group. We found weak correlations (r2=0.09 for
‘understanding’, r2=0.08 for ‘appreciation’, r2=0.07
for ‘reasoning’).
We tested formally for diagnosis by psychopatho-
logical variable interaction using the likelihood
ratio test. Our results show signiﬁcant interaction
terms between diagnosis and depressed and elated
mood, but not other psychopathological variables.
However, the power may have been inadequate, so we
report these other potential interactions despite non-
signiﬁcant p values.
Insight
Whole sample
In the whole sample, low insight was associated with
incapacity (Table 2). The eﬀect size is large (Hedges’
g=x2.19). The mean diﬀerence in insight score be-
tween those with and without capacity is 13.4 (95% CI
11.7–15.2). When this was adjusted for total BPRS
score, the adjusted mean diﬀerence was hardly chan-
ged at 13.3 (95% CI 11.3–15.2). This suggests that the
association between insight and capacity is not ex-
plained simply by severity of psychopathology.
Eﬀect of insight on capacity by diagnostic group
Insight is associated with lack of capacity status in all
three diagnostic groups (Table 3). Formal testing of
diagnosis by insight interaction shows possible eﬀect
modiﬁcation (p=0.14), with poor insight being more
strongly associated with incapacity in psychotic dis-
order and BPAD than non-psychotic disorder.
Fig. 1(a–c) are kernel density plots (a reﬁned type
of frequency plot) of scores on the insight scale for
patients with and without capacity for the three
diagnostic groups. The distributions in the psychotic
disorders group for capacity and incapacity are ap-
proximately Gaussian and meet in the mid-point of
the insight scale, suggesting that the insight scale
‘maps’ onto capacity status in patients with psychotic
disorders. ROC analysis gives an area under the curve
(AUC) of 0.92 (95% CI 0.87–0.98) and shows an opti-
mal cut-point of 15/28 (i.e. the mid-point) on the SAI-E
scale (sensitivity 0.83, speciﬁcity 0.87). The distribu-
tions in the BPAD group (Fig. 1b) for capacity and
incapacity appear Gaussian and show marked separ-
ation. ROC analysis gives an AUC of 0.99 (95%
CI 0.97–1.00) with an optimal cut-point of 24/28 on
the SAI-E scale (sensitivity 0.83, speciﬁcity 95.5). The
distributions in the non-psychotic disorder group
(Fig. 1c) for capacity and incapacity are less clearly
Gaussian. A broad range of insight scores are com-
patible with incapacity whereas only insight scores
>18 are compatible with capacity. This suggests that
the insight scale does not ‘map’ cleanly onto capacity
status in patients with non-psychotic disorders. ROC
analysis gives an AUC of 0.86 (95% CI 0.76–0.96) and
shows an optimal cut-point of 18 on the insight scale
(sensitivity 1.00, speciﬁcity 0.44).
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Fig. 1. Kernel density plots of insight scores in patients with
(a) psychotic disorders with and without capacity, (b) bipolar
aﬀective disorder (BPAD) with and without capacity and
(c) non-psychotic disorders with and without capacity.
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As the insight scale is composed of three compo-
nents (awareness of illness, relabelling of symptoms as
abnormal and treatment compliance), we compared
the ROC curve of the full scale with the ROCs of its
components and tested whether there where diﬀer-
ences in the areas under the ROC curves for these
three components. We tested this for a combined
group of patients with psychotic disorders and BPAD
because this is the population for whom the SAI-E was
principally designed, and expected to ﬁnd that re-
labelling had the best ROC curve. The area under the
ROC curve for the full SAI-E score was 0.94 (95% CI
0.89–0.98). The areas under the ROC curves for aware-
ness of illness, relabelling of symptoms and treatment
compliance were 0.91 (95% CI 0.86–0.96), 0.93 (95% CI
0.89–0.98) and 0.86 (95% CI 0.79–0.94) respectively
(x2=4.04, df=2, p=0.13). Therefore, the ROC of re-
labelling of symptoms is very similar to the ROC of
the full scale and there are no statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in the areas under the ROC curves for the
three components.
Conclusions
In this study we performed a detailed descriptive
analysis of the associations of incapacity in an acute
psychiatric setting. We found an apparent association
between female gender and non-White ethnic group
and incapacity. These associations are modiﬁed after
adjusting for confounding variables. The association
between Black African ethnicity and incapacity, al-
though weakened and non-signiﬁcant on controlling
for confounders, still shows a potentially important
eﬀect size. Whether such an association is mediated by
interview factor biases (e.g. culture and language), by
a bias within the structure of the capacity assessment
itself, by residual confounding (i.e. a failure to control
completely for potential confounders in the multi-
variate model), or by a real diﬀerence, is unclear.
A previous study in this population (Cairns et al. 2005)
reported an association between Black Caribbean
ethnicity and incapacity rather than Black African
ethnicity, but the numbers were small. Other studies
of this nature have not shown an association (Okai
et al. 2007). Analysing capacity interview transcripts
and videos by psychiatrists of diﬀerent cultural and
ethnic groups may be a helpful way to develop hy-
potheses in this area. It may also be helpful for such
interviews to be analysed by social scientists with an
interest in mental health, ethnicity and culture and by
non-psychiatric mental health stakeholders. The links
between ethnic group and mental health law are com-
plex but important to understand (Singh et al. 2007).
In our previous study of a similar population
(Cairns et al. 2005), the BPRS item ‘unusual thought
content ’ (synonymous with delusions) was associated
with incapacity. This result is replicated in this larger
study. Unusual thought content discriminates ca-
pacity status across diagnostic groups. We also found
that conceptual disorganization is associated with in-
capacity but it does not discriminate capacity status in
non-psychotic disorders. We found that our measure
of total psychopathology (adjusted total BPRS score) is
associated with incapacity and discriminates capacity
status across diagnostic groups. This was not found in
our previous study (Cairns et al. 2005). We regard this
as a good indication that it is important to adjust the
total BPRS score when used in acute samples. Unlike
the previous study, hallucinations were associated
with incapacity but this was a weaker association and
related to non-psychotic disorders, where halluci-
nations tend to be an exception. A similar pattern is
seen for matrix reasoning. It seems that hallucinations
and poor cognitive performance in non-psychotic dis-
orders are more indicative of an incapacitating mental
state than in psychotic disorders or BPAD. However, it
should be acknowledged that, although a more com-
prehensive measure of cognition than the one we used
(matrix reasoning) may have proved more discrimi-
nating in psychotic disorders, it would not be useful in
routine practice in this setting.
Like previous studies, we ﬁnd correlations between
cognitive performance and the MacCAT-T domain
scales in patients with psychotic disorders (Carpenter
et al. 2000 ; Palmer et al. 2004, 2005 ; Wong et al. 2005 ;
Palmer & Jeste, 2006), but the eﬀect sizes are small.
What is noteworthy is that cognitive performance is
not associated with the clinical judgement of inca-
pacity in psychotic disorders. This highlights an im-
portant diﬀerence between associations of capacity
conceptualized as dimensional measures and associ-
ations of incapacity conceptualized as a categorical
judgment guided by clinical and legal norms.
The relationship between mood and capacity is
striking. We have shown strong mood by diagnosis
interactions for both depressedmood and elatedmood.
Elated mood in the setting of BPAD is strongly associ-
ated with incapacity. Depressed mood in the setting of
non-psychotic disorders is also strongly associated
with incapacity. Thus, diagnostic group modiﬁes the
impact of a psychopathological variable on capacity,
and we suggest that the impact of psychopathological
variables onmental capacity depends on the diagnostic
group being studied. Hence, depressed mood is, if
anything, associated with capacity in psychotic dis-
orders, andmay be an indication that insight is present.
In the non-psychotic disorders (dominated as a group
by unipolar depression), depression is associated
with incapacity, presumably because it is a marker of
severity of the underlying disorder.
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The analysis of insight helps to clarify the signiﬁ-
cance of this concept for law. Low insight is associated
with incapacity. Of all the clinical constructs, insight
is the strongest discriminator of capacity status and
it discriminates across diagnostic groups. It is most
discriminatory in psychotic disorders and BPAD,
groups for whom the construct was designed. We
used ROCs as though insight was a ‘ test ’ for lack of
capacity ; something that in practice we do not advo-
cate. However, they make the point that insight would
be a much stronger test of incapacity in psychotic dis-
orders and BPAD than in non-psychotic disorders.
The ROCs for the ‘relabelling symptoms as abnormal ’
component of the insight scale are as good in psychotic
disorders and BPAD as the whole scale. This might be
an argument for recommending the three questions
that comprise this component as a helpful working
test for capacity in patients with psychotic disorders
and BPAD. These questions probe the extent to which
feelings, perceptions, thoughts and behaviours that
the interviewing clinician has already judged to be
manifestations of mental disorder can be ‘relabelled’
as such by the patient. Clearly, the validity of this
procedure is only as good as the quality of the pre-
ceding clinical assessment. Thus, there is a subjective
element to insight judgements even when it is being
measured using an operationalized construct such as
the SAI-E. The judgement pertains to : (1) the existence
of a mental disorder and (2) the extent to which the
patient can ‘see’ that this mental disorder does exist.
It pertains less to which model of mental disorder a
doctor or patient may hold (e.g. biological, psycho-
logical, social, religious). This ﬁnding is perhaps
counterintuitive ; it might have been predicted that the
rating of insight as it pertains to compliance, rather
than relabelling, would be most closely related to ca-
pacity to make treatment decisions, to a degree that
some regard as circular (Beck-Sandler, 1998; but see
David, 1998), but this does not seem to be the case.
In non-psychotic disorders the SAI-E meets limi-
tations as a test of capacity. It is a sensitive test ; insight
has to be low (around 20 out of 28 on the scale)
for false positives to occur. The test, however, lacks
speciﬁcity ; it generates false negatives on a wide range
of cut-oﬀ points on the insight scale. A clinical ex-
ample to illustrate how this can happen comes from a
patient with depression seen in the study who was
thought to lack capacity to decide on medication.
When asked how the profoundly low mood she
was experiencing was to be explained, she attributed
it to a mind and body that was ill with depression.
On the SAI-E this is a correct attribution of a symptom
to an illness and scores full points for that question.
What was ‘pathological ’ about her attribution was
her experience of depressive illness as guilt and
punishment ; the idea of treatment made no sense. The
consequence was that, in attributing her lowmood to a
depressive illness, she was attributing it to her guilt
and punishment because the meaning of depressive
illness and guilt and punishment had become fused in
her mind. The SAI-E did not capture this.
The problems that insight, as constructed by the
SAI-E, has in non-psychotic disorders are not necess-
arily surprising (it was not constructed for this group),
but it does leave us without a simple clinical means of
assessing capacity in people with non-psychotic dis-
orders. More work is needed to try to clarify a clinical
approach to capacity in this group.
As far as we know, this is the largest study of
the associations of capacity yet conducted. It uses a
structured capacity judgement, rather than scores on a
capacity scale, as a basis for the analysis of associations
using variables that are well used and familiar to
clinicians. It thus directly informs clinicians invested
with the responsibility to judge decision-making ca-
pacity.
Broad associations have been reported and our
hypothesis that diagnostic group modiﬁes the psy-
chopathological associations of decisional capacity has
been supported. A limitation of this study is that the
psychopathological measures are blunt, the decisions
are simpliﬁed and the diagnostic groups imprecise.
We suggest that future eﬀorts to ‘get inside’ inca-
pacity in psychiatric disorders will have to investigate
more well-deﬁned diagnostic groups and take a more
ﬁne-grained phenomenological approach.
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